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Abstract
This paper contributes to the emerging empirical literature on penny auctions, a particular
type of all-pay auctions. We focus on the potential learning e¤ects that bidders may experience
over time but also (and particularly) across auctions as a result of their auction participation.
Using detailed bid-level information, we nd that, similarly to earlier literature, bidders su¤er
from a sunk cost fallacy, whereby their probability of dropping out of an auction is decreasing
in the number of bids they have already placed in that auction. Whilst we do nd that learning
through repeated participation alleviates the sunk cost fallacy, participation in simultaneous
penny auctions emerges as a much more e¤ective learning mechanism, ultimately contributing
towards bidders earning higher individual surpluses.
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1 Introduction
The penny auction was popularized by rms like Swoopo and is still used by online auction com-
panies, as well as by traditional retailers across the world.1 In a penny auction, bidding usually
starts at zero and bidders must pay a bid cost to increase the sale price by a small amount 
typically one penny, hence the name of the auction.2 A key attraction of this type of auction is the
possibility of paying substantially less than the retail price for an object. However, this does not
necessarily mean the auctioneer has made a loss. For instance, if each bid in a penny auction costs
$1 to place, an iPad with a retail price of $500 which is sold for $75 in a penny auction yields a
revenue of $7575 to the auctioneer ($7500 from bid costs plus $75 from the actual sale price) and
a substantial prot margin. Indeed, the recent interest in penny auctions has been driven both
by its popularity as an e-commerce mechanism, as well as by the empirically observed high prot
margins a clear violation of auction theory (expected revenue should equal the goods value) and
yet another real-world example of overbidding in auctions.
The standard game theoretical analysis assumes players arrive at a Nash equilibrium through
an introspective process, in which they form beliefs about their opponents actions, and beliefs
about their opponentsbeliefs about their own actions, and so on. While real people may be able
to engage in this type of mental process in simple games with few players and with a unique Nash
equilibrium, it is less reasonable to expect this to be true in more complex games with many players
and multiple equilibria, as is the case of penny auctions. Instead, as already suggested in the penny
auction literature, which we review below, it may be that repeated experience (over time, within
a given auction or in subsequent auctions) in this type of game allows players to learn what the
optimal strategy is (or at least allows players to identify and use payo¤-enhancing strategies).
1Swoopo led for bankruptcy in 2011.
2Whilst penny auctions bear some resemblance to the war-of-attrition game, a type of all-pay auction, they are
not a special case of any type of all-pay auctions (Hinnosaar, 2014).
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However, a dimension which has thus far been ignored is the potential contribution that partic-
ipation in simultaneous auctions has in this learning process. Indeed, experiencemay be obtained
vertically, over time through bid submission or auction participation, but also horizontally, within
a time window but through bid submission or simultaneous participation in more than one auction.
Theoretically (Mertens, 1992) one would expect such parallel auctions to be independent and thus
not a¤ect bidding behavior; in reality it may actually speed up the bidderslearning process. To
the best of our knowledge, this is a little-explored subject in the economics literature.3 In penny
auctions, bidders are learning a complex object. We conjecture that by virtue of participating
in concurrent auctions with di¤erent types of bidders, or even by bidding in auctions at di¤erent
stages, subjects can learn (i) how to play a particular optimal strategy, or learn that (ii) there are
potentially di¤erent optimal strategies faster than if they only take part in one auction.
There is a small (experimental) literature on behavioral spillovers which is somewhat related to
these learning e¤ects. Cason et al. (2012) consider a behavioral spillover to exist when observed
behavior in a game is di¤erent depending on whether that game is played together with other games
or in isolation and acknowledge that learning e¤ects can be a source of such spillovers.4
With the objective of analyzing such learning e¤ects, we study data from 403 penny auctions
conducted by a telecommunications operator between June and December 2011.5 Our database of-
3 In neuroscience, Sigman et al. (2008) show the coexistence of serial and parallel brain processes during the
performance of a cognitive task. Gombrich (2011) puts forward a tentative denition of series learning (equivalent to
our vertical learning) as opposed to parallel learning (equivalent to our horizontal learning), borrowing from the
working of electric circuits: through series learning, one learns one thing after another to arrive at a total amount of
knowledge, whilst through parallel learning one learns several things at the same time to arrive at the same amount
of total knowledge. In the machine learning (and articial neural networks) literature, Caruana (1995) proposes
and tests several mechanisms through which neural nets learning through multiple related tasks can outperform
sequential learning, as it enables a more generalizable representation of a particular feature. Wason (1960) pioneered
the paradigm of rule discovery, which studies how humans develop hypotheses from observing data from unknown
data generation processes. This is also illustrated well by Baxter (1995), who points out that engaging in multiple
tasks enables learning more general representations of concepts.
4 In particular, Cason et al. (2012) look at (two di¤erent) coordination games and nd strong spillovers when the
games are played sequentially, but not when they are played simultaneously. In the same vein, Falk et al. (2013)
analyze two identical and completely independent (coordination or public good) games, played simultaneously, and
also nd no evidence of behavioral spillovers. By contrast, Bednar et al. (2012) do nd spillovers when (two di¤erent)
games are played simultaneously, but these games are di¤erent from Cason et al. (2012).
5The operator requested its identity not to be disclosed.
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fers distinct advantages to study the role of learning through participation in simultaneous auctions.
The telecommunications operator auctions o¤ essentially ve types of items: mobile phones, tablet
PCs, laptops, mobile services (e.g., games, etc.) and USB pens for mobile internet access. Whilst
certainly di¤erentiated within each type, these items belong to a relatively homogeneous category
of products: devices and/or services which may enhance usersbenets from their current mobile
subscriptions. In that sense, these auctions may attract a relatively homogeneous set of potential
bidders and this appears to be adequate to study learning e¤ects. By comparison, Swoopo or other
major penny auction websites sell a wider variety of items to certainly more heterogeneous bidders.
We nd that the telecommunications operator has an average prot margin of 219%: it obtains
an average revenue of e1,224 per auctioned item, whose average retail price is e370. There is
signicant dispersion in prot margins (including large negative prot margins), and its distribution
exhibits positive skewness and is, thus, right-tailed. Our detailed bid-level dataset allows us to
investigate drivers of bidding behavior. First, we analyze the decision to participate in a penny
auction and nd that the probability of participation by an individual bidder is decreasing with the
number of simultaneous auctions and bidder experience  evidence of both vertical and horizontal
learning e¤ects. Second, we investigate what determines the likelihood of an active bidder dropping
out of the auction. We nd evidence of Augenblicks (2016) sunk cost fallacy in our data: the
probability of an individual bidder leaving an auction decreases with the number of bids she has
already placed in that auction. However, experience contributes signicantly towards alleviating it
(as in Augenblick, 2016), as does  to a more noticeable extent  the simultaneous participation
in more than one penny auction, suggesting that horizontal learning may be more e¤ective than
vertical learning. This empirical evidence appears to support the existence of behavioral spillovers,
both when auctions are conducted sequentially, as well as simultaneously, and the latter is in
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contrast with the (experimental) evidence of Falk et al. (2013).6
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contextualizes our paper in
the literature. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 contains the main analysis. Section 5
concludes. Appendix A contains additional material.
2 Literature review
The literature on penny auctions is relatively recent. Augenblick (2016) proposes a tractable penny
auction model, for which he obtains a Markov perfect equilibrium. He uses auction-level and bid-
level data from Swoopo to show that the sunk cost fallacy (as bidders spend more money on bids,
they become more reluctant to leave the auction although the bidding costs are sunk) explains the
persistence of auction participation above and beyond the prediction of the normative model. In
turn this provides a rationale for the observed high and positive (51%) average prot margins in
Swoopo auctions. Bidders apparently learn how to use more e¤ective bidding strategies (including
aggressive bidding strategies), but such learning takes place at a very slow rate and requires a large
number of submitted bids (and consequently high losses).
Hinnosaar (2014) provides an alternative analysis of the penny auction game and shows that
there are multiple symmetric, stationary, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria. Platt et al. (2013) an-
alyze a penny auction model which explicitly allows bidders to have risk-loving preferences (rather
than the traditional assumption of risk neutrality), in an attempt to explain excess prots. Using
data from Swoopo, they nd that bidding patterns are consistent with some degree of risk lov-
ing, thus rationalizing the observed high average prot margins. However, they do not analyze
individual-level behavior because they rely solely on auction-level data.
Byers et al. (2010) also try to explain excess prots by considering informational asymmetries,
6Particular care must be taken in interpreting (and comparing) this result because, unlike the experimental setup
of Falk et al. (2013), the environment which characterizes simultaneous penny auctions does not control for all
possible di¤erences between the auctions.
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whereby some bidders are better informed regarding the number of active bidders at any given
point in time.7 Unlike Augenblick (2016), Byers et al. (2010) nd that whilst aggressive bidding
strategies are associated with higher winning probabilities, they also lead to lower bidder surpluses.
Wang and Xu (2012) use data from BigDeal.com to study the role of bidder sophistication. In
particular, they nd that auctioneers benet from penny auctions only if participating bidders are
inexperienced. Experienced and strategically sophisticated bidders, who over time learn how to
time their bids so as to maximize their surplus, earn a small and positive surplus.
Goodman (2012) also uses data from Swoopo and explores e¤ective strategies (bidding fre-
quently, bidding immediately after the previous bid and using automated bidding services) that
bidders use to increase their surplus, typically associated with aggressive and reputation-building
behavior. Experimentally, Caldara (2012) nds that overbidding decreases over time, risk averse
individuals submit fewer bids than risk-neutral individuals, strategic sophistication is an important
driver of outcomes (conrming Wang and Xus, 2012, results), signaling strategies are used, but
with little success, and the learning process also involves learning not to bid in further auctions.
3 Data description
The data used in this paper consists of penny auctions conducted by a telecommunications operator
roughly on a monthly basis for a period of ve working days which we dene as auction week.8
On average, there are approximately 10 penny auctions in each day of the auction week. Auction
weeks were advertised in advance on the operators website as well as through targeted emails,
blogs, social networks and other websites. Bidding was restricted to that operators subscribers
and could be done through SMS or through the operators auction website.
7Byers et al. (2010) also exploit the role of asymmetric valuations of the good for sale, as well as asymmetries in
bidding costs.
8As we will later see, the only exception to this rule occurred in December 2011, where the auction lasted for 10
working days (over a two-week period).
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The operators website displayed all of the days penny auctions, as well as each auctions
starting time. Typically, each auction started 30 minutes after the previous one began. Mobile
phones were the most commonly auctioned item, but laptops, tablet PCs, USB pens for broadband
wireless access and services (e.g., one year of free SMS, 6 months of free online gaming, etc.) were
also auctioned. For each auction, a detailed description of the item was provided, including its
main characteristics, as well as its retail price.
All auctions shared the following features: auctions were conducted in euros (e), the starting
price was e0 and the auction nishing time was set for one hour after its start; each bidder placed
bids, which raised the current high bid by a xed e0.01 increment; each bid placed had a non-
refundable bid cost of e0.50 (charged directly to the bidders phone bill). All bids placed within
the rst hour of the auction did not change its nishing time; however, all bids placed after the
initial one hour period extended the auction nishing time by one minute. The winning bidder
was whoever held the current high bid once the auction reached its nishing time. The winning
bidders total auction cost for the good was the number of bids placed times the bid cost plus the
nal auction price. All other bidders forfeited their bidding costs.
After each auction nished, the operator posted on the website the auction duration, nal price,
the di¤erence between nal price and retail price, and the bid, time of bid and identity of the bidder
for the last ve bids (including the auction winner). This information was publicly available until
the start of the following auction week (roughly for a one-month period) and we manually collected
it for 414 auctions pertaining to seven auction weeks between June and December 2011.
In addition to this, we contacted the operator in order to obtain more detailed bid-level data,
which includes, for each auction, the time of the bid and the (numeric) identity of the bidder. In
total, we received bid level information for all 414 auctions in the auction database, totaling 956,742
bids placed by 38,733 unique bidders. A closer inspection of the two databases revealed a coverage
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problem, which has led us to exclude 11 auctions from the analysis and focus on 403 auctions, for
which we have 940,968 bids placed by 38,000 unique bidders in the bid level database.9
Table 6 (Appendix A) presents the descriptive statistics of the auction-level database. On
average, the nal auction price was e24.01 and bid costs yielded e1,200.50 in revenue, which
means that, using as a reference the average retail price of e369.97, each auction yielded a net
prot of e854.77 - a prot margin of 219%.10 Figure 1 (Appendix A) shows that some auctions
present negative (and large, in absolute value) prot margins, but others yield extremely high prot
margins. There is also some variability across auction weeks and between item types. On average,
there are 6.88 auctions active at the same time (simultaneous auctions) and, in each auction, 2,401
bids were placed by 439 unique bidders. Table 7 (Appendix A) presents the descriptive statistics
of the bid-level database, which contains 176,908 unique bidder-auction combinations.
9Note that the auction-level database, by registering the nal bid, allows us to infer the total number of bids
placed in each auction because each bid increment is xed and equal to e0.01. Comparing the total number of bids in
each auction both in the auction-level as well as in the bid-level database, we noted that the latter typically contained
fewer bids than suggested by the former. This problem was particularly acute for 11 auctions in the original sample.
In 10 out of these 11 auctions, the coverage was below 30%. We suspect that this may have been due to an error
in the bid-registering software (the operator could not explain this), as all these 11 excluded auctions occurred on a
given day (14th December 2011) and the missing bid-level observations related to bids placed after 7pm. The average
coverage of these 403 auctions was 97.2%. The coverage problem was widespread and a¤ected 76% of these 403
auctions that is, the two databases only coincided fully for 24% of all auctions. But in most cases, the di¤erences
were relatively small  basically a few missing bids from the bid level database for each auction (the median is 8
missing bids per auction), which could be explained by small errors in the operators registering procedure: 44.5%
of auctions were missing less than 1% of bids; 57% were missing less than 2%; and 66.5% were missing less than 5%.
Therefore, only 9.5% of auctions had missing bids in excess of 5%.
10The average prot margin in our dataset (219%) is clearly higher than in Augenblick (2016) (51%). This could
be associated with the type of good most frequently auctioned in our dataset: mobile phones account for 85% of
total auctions. Augenblick (2016), Platt et al. (2013), Byers et al. (2010) and Goodman (2012) all focus on Swoopo
auctions typically auctions of consumer goods, such as home electronics, computer accessories, videogames-related
items and other consumer goods. Platt et al. (2013, Figure 2) present evidence of signicantly higher deviations
(reported in standard deviation units) between observed and theoretical average revenue for videogames-related items:
the distribution is clearly right-tailed, with 30% (approx. 50%) of items having average revenue greater than one
(one half) standard deviation above the models prediction. Byers et al. (2010, Figure 3) present evidence of an
average prot margin of 86%, with the item that is more frequently auctioned obtaining an average prot margin of
365% (Wii Play with Wii Remote). Goodman (2012, Table 3) provides a breakdown of average prot margins by bid
increment and by good value: although the average (overall) prot margin is 67%, for some bid increments (2 cents
and 6 cents) it is higher than that 126% and 132% respectively , and, for those same increments and for goods
whose value is in the $25-$50 range, it is even higher (477% and 240% respectively). Therefore, although average
prot margins in our datasets penny auctions are higher than in Swoopo auctions, there are several instances in
which the latter yield comparable or even higher prot margins.
8
4 Analysis and results
4.1 Auction level analysis
Using data from the auction-level database, we wish to understand the main drivers of nal prices
in penny auctions. The auction price is, in e¤ect, a duration-type variable: higher auction prices
indicate, according to the bidding rules, longer durations and, because we have normalized auction
prices by dividing them by the retail price of the auctioned item (as suggested by Augenblick, 2016),
we can compare the durations of auctions of di¤erent items.11 On this basis, we have estimated a
model assuming the Gompertz and the Weibull distributions for the hazard rates, as well as Coxs
partial likelihood model (which places no restrictions on the shape of the baseline hazard rate).12 ;13
As potential explanatory variables we have included: (i) the average number of simultaneous
auctions; (ii) the number of normalized (divided by the retail price) rst hour bids;14 (iii) the
auction week in question; (iv) the type and (v) brand of the auctioned item; (vi) the number
of unique bidders; and (vii) a Herndahl-Hirschman concentration index of unique biddersbids.
Table 9 displays the results of our estimations.
First, note that all models produce very similar estimates, which is somewhat reassuring. Sec-
ond, the exponentiated (signicant) coe¢ cient of the average number of simultaneous auctions
11 In order to establish a parallel with survival analysis, we refer to the normalized auction prices as normalized
time. Figure 2 (in Appendix A) presents the estimated (smoothed) hazard rate using a kernel with a bandwidth of
2, where we can see that the hazard rate appears to be (almost always) increasing with normalized time; in Figure
2, we have also plotted the logarithm of the cumulative hazard against that of normalized time. The fact that we
obtain a relatively straight line suggests that the underlying hazard rate in the data could be coming from a Weibull
distribution.
12We have estimated the hazard rates for each parametric distribution and for each model and obtained their
respective Akaikes Information Criterion (AIC). This method takes into account a models log-likelihood, but also
the number of covariates and the number of model-specic parameters (see Akaike, 1974, or Cleves et al., 2010, p.
281, on its application for survival analysis). We have thus identied the two parametric distributions with lower
AIC scores in Table 8 (Appendix A). The Weibull and the Gompertz distributions emerge as sensible candidates.
13As Jenkins (2005) notes, models di¤er not only in terms of the shape assumed for the hazard rate but also in terms
of their specication and interpretation. They can be divided into proportional hazard (PH) models or accelerated
failure time (AFT) models. Of the estimated models, Cox and Gompertz are PH, whilst the Weibull model can be
written in both specications. In PH models, (exponentiated) coe¢ cients are hazard ratios: a coe¢ cient of 1.05 for
an explanatory variable indicates that a unit increase in that explanatory variable increases the baseline hazard rate
by a factor of 1.05.
14This variable measures the extent to which bidders may be using signaling strategies by bidding in the rst hour
(a weakly dominated strategy), as documented by Goodman (2012).
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indicates that, all else constant, an additional simultaneous auction increases the baseline hazard
rate by 21-27%. Third, the number of normalized rst hour bids signicantly decreases the hazard
rate (by 81-88%), i.e., rst hour bidding activity is an important explanatory factor of auction
duration. And, nally, all else constant, an additional unique bidder decreases the hazard rate by
0.5%. Relating these results to our main research question, we nd that, at the auction level:
Observation 1: Auction duration varies inversely with the number of simultaneous auctions.
This could be interpreted as a supply-induced e¤ect (more simultaneous auctions could induce
a xed number of constrained bidders to bid less) or as a rst hint for the existence of (aggregate)
horizontal learning e¤ects (if the supply-induced e¤ect is small).
4.2 Bid level analysis
4.2.1 Decision to participate in an auction
We have used the bid-level database to construct a balanced panel with 15,314,000 observations,
which includes all unique bidders (38,000) in all auctions (403). In that panel, the dummy variable
participatetakes on the value of 1 if bidder i participated in auction j and 0 otherwise.
Our purpose is to look deeper into the motivation of each bidder to participate in an auction.
In addition to the average number of simultaneous auctions, the auction week in question, the type
and brand of the auctioned item, we also consider three additional variables: the retail price, the
number of bids previously submitted by each bidder (in other auctions) and the number of auctions
previously won by each bidder. The number of previously submitted bids is of particular interest
for two reasons: on the one hand, because it entails a cost, bidders who have already submitted
many bids prior to auction j may be (relatively more) nancially constrained and hence decide not
to participate in that auction; on the other hand, it is clearly a proxy for bidder experience (as
in Augenblick, 2016, or Goodman, 2012). Moreover, we have adapted the variables related to the
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dependent variable: participate
dummies for auction w eek
dummies for type of good
dummies for brand of good
retail price 0.00002 (0) ***
average number of simultaneous auctions -0.00167 (0.00001) ***
HHI of unique bidders' bids until participation decision 0.000002 (0) ***
number of unique bidders until participation decision -0.00002 (0) ***
number of previously submitted bids -0.00002 (0) ***
number of previous auction w ins 0.00785 (0.00019) ***
N
Log-likelihood
LR (chi-square) / Wald (chi-square)
(***) Significant at the 1% level; (**) Signif icant at the 5% level;
(*) Signif icant at the 10% level
15,314,000
-837,004
169,935
yes
yes
yes
RE probit
Coef. (Std. error)
Table 1: Random-e¤ects probit results on decision to participate
number of unique bidders and the HHI of unique biddersbids to this setting.15
Table 1 contains the results of a random-e¤ects probit specication, with participateas the
dependent variable. The results are presented as marginal e¤ects evaluated at the mean. Almost
all variables are statistically signicant and the coe¢ cientssigns appear plausible.16 For instance,
a higher retail price increases the probability of bidder participation, whilst a higher number of
simultaneous auctions decreases it. Interestingly, the probability of a bidder participating in an
auction is decreasing with the number of previously submitted bids. This suggests that as bidders
become more experienced over time, they learn to participate less often in penny auctions.17
Observation 2: More experienced bidders are less likely to enter in new auctions.
15Given that the participation decision occurs at a given moment in time (when the bidder submits her rst bid
in a given auction), we have computed the number of unique bidders and the HHI of unique biddersbids in that
auction until that point in time - e¤ectively measuring potential perceivedcompetition up to the point where the
bidder decides to participate. If the bidder decides not to participate, we use the number of unique bidders and HHI
of unique biddersbids at the end of the auction.
16The marginal e¤ects appear to be very small, but one must bear in mind that 98.8% of the observations for the
dependent variable (participate) take on the value of 0, that is, we only observe 176,908 bidder-auction participations
(see Table 7) in a total of 15,314,000 possible combinations. Therefore, although the marginal e¤ects (evaluated at
the mean) are small, they entail rather more noticeable percentage increases in the participation probability.
17 In addition, the number of auctions previously won has a positive coe¢ cient, which implies that previous auction
wins have a positive e¤ect on the probability of participating in subsequent auctions. Finally, perceived competition
(measured through the number of unique bidders until the participation decision) has a negative e¤ect on the partici-
pation probability. However, unique biddersbid concentration has the opposite e¤ect: that is, a higher concentration
of bids (which could be interpreted as a seriousness of competitionindicator) actually increases the probability of
participation.
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Observation 3: The higher is the number of simultaneous auctions, the lower is the probability of
entering an auction.
4.2.2 Individual pseudo-hazard rates
We have also adopted Augenblicks (2016) methodology to estimate individual-level pseudo hazard
rates, which are dened as the probability that an individual exits an auction given the number
of bids she has already submitted up to that point. Therefore, we have created a dummy variable
leavewhich is equal to 1 if a bidders bid in an auction is her last bid in that auction and 0
otherwise. We have then estimated a random-e¤ects probit model for two di¤erent specications.
Under a rst specication, we have included as explanatory variables: (i) the average number
of simultaneous auctions; (ii) a rst hour bid dummy variable; (iii) the number of simultaneous
auctions in which the bidder is actively participating; (iv) the number of unique bidders until the
moment a bid is submitted; (v) the Herndahl-Hirschman concentration index of unique bidders
bids until the moment a bid is submitted; (vi) the number of bids submitted by the bidder in
that auction; (vii) the number of bids submitted by the bidder in previous auctions (a proxy for
experience);18 (viii) the number of auctions previously won by the bidder; (ix) the bid amount; (x)
the auction week dummies; (xi) the type and (xii) brand of the auctioned item.
Under a second specication, we have followed Augenblick (2016) by adding an interaction
variable between experience (number of previously submitted bids) and the number of bids placed
in the auction. We have also interacted simultaneous auction participation with the number of
bids placed in the auction. Finally, we have also interacted the rst hour dummy variable with
experience and the number of simultaneous auctions in which the bidder is participating. Table 2
presents the results as marginal e¤ects evaluated at the mean.
First, the coe¢ cient on the average number of simultaneous auctions is positive and statistically
18Rather than using the absolute number of bids (in the auction and in previous auctions), we have chosen to use
their logs because of convergence problems in model estimation.
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dependent variable: leave
dummies for auction w eek
dummies for type of good
dummies for brand of good
average number of simultaneous auctions 0.02955 (0.00055) *** 0.02958 (0.00055) ***
f irst hour bid (dummy) -0.00657 (0.00366) * -0.01419 (0.00589) **
f irst hour bid (dummy) x ln(number of previously submitted bids) -0.00392 (0.00262)
first hour bid (dummy) x ln(number of simultaneous auctions in w hich bidder is participating) 0.01911 (0.00584) ***
number of unique bidders until bid submitted 0.00011 (0.00001) *** 0.00011 (0.00001) ***
HHI of unique bidders' bids until bid is submitted 0.00000 (0) 0.00000 (0)
ln(number of bids submitted in auction) -0.11852 (0.00071) *** -0.17833 (0.00184) ***
ln(number of previously submitted bids) 0.05555 (0.00099) *** 0.04739 (0.00102) ***
ln(number of simultaneous auctions in w hich bidder is participating) 0.05263 (0.00132) *** 0.04533 (0.00178) ***
ln(number of previously submitted bids) x ln(number of bids submitted in auction) 0.01428 (0.00043) ***
ln(number of simultaneous auctions in w hich bidder is participating) x ln(number of bids submitted in auction) 0.00597 (0.00089) ***
number of previous auction w ins 0.01592 (0.00459) *** -0.00215 (0.00461)
bid amount 0.00011 (0.00011) -0.00001 (0.00011)
N
Log-likelihood
LR (chi-square) / Wald (chi-square)
(***) Signif icant at the 1% level; (**) Signif icant at the 5% level; (*) Signif icant at the 10% level
RE probit RE probit
Coef. (Std. error) Coef. (Std. error)
yes
yes
yes yes
yes
yes
940,968
-385,991
40,800 42,429
-385,315
940,968
Table 2: Pseudo hazard rate estimation
signicant. Second, rst hour bids decrease the pseudo-hazard rate, that is, a bidder who submits a
bid in the rst hour of the auction is less likely to drop out.19 Third, the sunk cost fallacy is present:
the probability of leaving the auction decreases with the number of bids already placed by the
bidder in that auction. By contrast, participation in simultaneous auctions increases the drop out
probability, as does experience. Fourth, we nd that bidder experience does tend to reduce the e¤ect
of an additional bid on the probability of leaving the auction (interaction term between experience
and the number of bids submitted in the second column), that is, it alleviates the sunk cost fallacy,
a result which is similar to that obtained by Augenblick (2016). Interestingly, participation in
multiple simultaneous auctions also appears to have an important role towards alleviating the sunk
cost fallacy, as the interaction variable between simultaneous auction participation and the number
of bids submitted has a positive (and signicant) coe¢ cient (second column).
Observation 4: There is evidence of behavioral spillovers, some of which consist of vertical and
19This seems to suggest that rst hour bids may indeed be used as signaling or reputation-building strategies, as
suggested by Goodman (2012).
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horizontal learning e¤ects. Both types of learning contribute to alleviating the sunk cost fallacy.
4.3 Individual level analysis
In order to gain a better understanding of bidding behavior, we now turn our attention to in-
dividual bidders and to the possible existence of a positive relationship between bidder surplus
and experience.20 We explore the issue in more detail by calculating total auction surplus for
each bidder-auction combination and then regress it on several variables of interest using OLS.
Table 3 reports the results. The rst two columns refer to a generic specication (with and without
bidder-specic xed e¤ects) where a bidders surplus in an auction may be explained by a quadratic
function of experience (measured through the number of previously submitted bids), a quadratic
function of the number of simultaneous auctions in which the bidder is participating, a dummy
variable which takes on the value of 1 if a particular bidder has won that specic auction and two
measures of bidding competition (the number of unique bidders in that auction until the bidder in
question decides to quit and a HHI index of those unique biddersbids).
In both specications, experience exhibits a broadly negative relationship with surpluses, whilst
participation in simultaneous auctions has a broadly positive impact on surplus. Evaluated at
the mean, the marginal e¤ect of experience on surplus under both specications is negative; in
addition, it is negative for almost all experience levels under column 1s specication and only
becomes positive for very high experience levels (99th percentile). Also evaluated at the mean, the
marginal e¤ect of simultaneous auction participation on surplus is positive; however, it becomes
negative for high levels of simultaneous auction participation (4th quartile).
These results are largely consistent with earlier literature and show that experience and simulta-
neous auction participation induce di¤erent bidder responses in the bidding process. Some factors
could help explain why more experienced bidders exhibit a di¤erent bidding behavior and we look
20Augenblick (2016), Goodman (2012) and Wang and Xu (2012) nd such a positive relationship.
14
Dep. variable: individual auction surplus
dummies for auction w eek
dummies for type of good
dummies for brand of good
individual-specif ic dummies (f ixed ef fects)
number of previously submitted bids -0.0363 (0.0005) *** -0.0529 (0.001) *** -0.0198 (0.0005) *** -0.0347 (0.001) ***
(number of previously submitted bids)^2 0.000006 (0) *** 0.000014 (0) *** 0.000002 (0) *** 0.000008 (0) ***
number of simultaneous auctions in w hich bidder is participating 0.085 (0.05) * 0.143 (0.07) ** 0.108 (0.04) ** 0.165 (0.06) ***
(number of simultaneous auctions in w hich bidder is participating)^2 -0.013 (0.006) ** -0.023 (0.009) *** -0.002 (0.005) -0.005 (0.008)
proportion of ow n bids in total bids -761.71 (5.42) *** -732.78 (6.55) ***
(proportion of  ow n bids in total bids)^2 1,200.89 (28.35) *** 1,030.99 (35.88) ***
number of bidder f irst hour bids -0.678 (0.02) *** -0.668 (0.03) ***
bidder proportion of f irst hour bids 67.73 (2.32) *** 64.13 (2.96) ***
number of bidding streak episodes -0.002 (0.0007) *** -0.001 (0.0009)
auction w inner dummy 333.99 (0.53) *** 335.31 (0.58) *** 345.60 (0.5) *** 346.17 (0.55) ***
HHI of unique bidders' bids until bidder quits -0.00001 (0.0001) 0.00016 (0.0001) ** 0.00027 (0.0001) *** 0.00031 (0.0001) ***
number of unique bidders until bidder quits -0.0021 (0.0001) *** -0.0029 (0.0001) *** -0.0027 (0.0001) *** -0.0033 (0.0002) ***
constant -1.026 (0.21) *** -2.570 (0.3) *** 0.305 (0.2) -0.710 (0.28) **
N
R2
F-test
(***) Signif icant at the 1% level; (**) Signif icant at the 5% level; (*) Signif icant at the 10% level
176,908
0.74
14,971
176,908
0.74
12,147
176,908
0.70
14,406
176,908
0.71
12,086
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
OLS OLS w ith f ixed effects OLS OLS w ith f ixed effects
Coef. (Std. error) Coef. (Std. error) Coef. (Std. error) Coef. (Std. error)
Table 3: Individual-level auction surplus regressions
at them under the specications of the 3rd and 4th columns (with and without bidder-specic xed
e¤ects) of Table 3. For example, both Augenblick (2016) and Goodman (2012) identify bidding
runs as a potential signaling mechanism through which a bidder signals her commitment and in-
terest in winning the auction. In our data, once bidder-specic xed e¤ects are considered, such
bidding streak episodes do not appear to a¤ect surpluses in a signicant way.21 In addition, we
follow Goodman (2012) and introduce a quadratic function of own bid proportion in total auction
bids - possibly a signaling device used by more experienced bidders. We nd that for 99.7% of
bidder-auction observations, own bid proportion has a negative e¤ect on auction surplus.22 First
hour bids may be particularly e¤ective signaling devices, as they allow for reputation e¤ects to be
established early in the auction (Goodman, 2012). Therefore, we have also included as potential
explanatory variables the number of rst hour bids and the proportion of a bidders rst hour bids
21Without xed e¤ects, bidding streak episodes have a negative impact on surplus, a result which is opposite to
that obtained by Augenblick (2016) and Goodman (2012).
22This result contrasts with that of Goodman (2012), who nds that own bid proportion has a positive impact on
surplus for a much lower threshold, i.e., bidding frequently and (possibly) in a well-timed manner raises surplus.
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in total rst hour bids and nd that, similarly to Goodman (2012), rst hour bids appear to be a
useful and e¤ective signaling mechanism.23
Importantly, with the exception of rst hour bids, these signaling strategies are rather ine¤ective.
When they are taken into account (3rd and 4th column of Table 3), the marginal e¤ect of experience
on surplus is not as high (in absolute value) as in columns 1 and 2, but remains negative for virtually
all experience levels. At the same time, the positive marginal e¤ect on surplus of simultaneous
auction participation is higher than in columns 1 and 2, further reinforcing the previous result that
this is a much more e¤ective learning tool.
Observation 5: Simultaneous participation in multiple auctions (horizontal learning) is a more
e¤ective learning mechanism than bidding over time within and across auctions.
4.4 Robustness of results
4.4.1 Budget constraints
The participation of bidders in simultaneous auctions raises the possibility that they may be allo-
cating a xed budget across auctions, in the vein of Colonel Blotto games, a constant-sum game in
which two players simultaneously distribute forces across n battleelds and, within each battleeld,
the player who has allocated a higher force wins (see Roberson, 2006, or Hart, 2008).24 There are
three notable di¤erences between Colonel Blotto games and penny auctions: (i) in Colonel Blotto
games, the chosen strategy has an opportunity cost (the potential benet of using a force in a
di¤erent battleeld) whilst in penny auctions there is a direct bidding cost; (ii) the Colonel Blotto
game is a static constant-sum game whilst penny auctions are dynamic non constant-sum games;
23The number of rst hour bids attempts to capture absolute reputation signals, whilst the proportion of a bidders
rst hour bids attempts to capture relative reputation signals. We nd that the marginal e¤ect of an additional rst
hour bid is negative (and larger, in absolute value, than e0.50, the bid cost) but the marginal e¤ect of a bidders
rst hour bid proportion is positive. When the latter is evaluated at the mean, the marginal e¤ect of an additional
bid is very close to the bid cost (e0.52). This suggests that provided the proportion of a bidders rst hour bids is
relatively high (certainly higher than the mean), there may be an expectation of a net positive marginal e¤ect on
surplus of rst hour bids (insofar as the expected surplus gain through a rst hour bid is higher than the bid cost),
that is, rst hour bids appear to be a useful and e¤ective signaling mechanism.
24We would like to thank an associate editor and an anonymous referee for suggesting this line of analysis.
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(iii) and in Colonel Blotto games, the nal (non-negative) payo¤ is the proportion on wins across
battleelds (regardless of the force levels allocated to each battleeld), whilst in penny auctions
the nal payo¤ crucially depends on the overall bid costs across all auctions.
Nevertheless, a relevant similarity is that bidders in penny auctions may be budget constrained
when choosing their strategies and it is important to test whether that is the case. The data does
not allow for a direct test and we have thus followed an indirect approach. First, within each
auction week, we assume that budget constraints may a¤ect bidding behavior on a daily basis,
that is, the behavior of bidder i in auction day t is a¤ected by her decisions (and total nancial
expenditure) in day t   1: Second, we assume that bidders are not nancially constrained across
auction weeks.25 With this framework in mind, we use the bid level database and calculate, for each
bidder and for each auction day in which she was active, bidder-specic and auction day-specic
variables (in total, 80,349 active bidder-auction day observations).26
Our general approach was the following: does a bidders choice of (i) how many bids to place
or (ii) the total number of auctions in which she participates depend on other bidder-specic or
auction day-specic variables, including the previous days total nancial expenditure (a proxy for
the possible existence of a budget constraint)? To answer this question, we have implemented
two specications. In a rst specication, we have expanded our dataset to include all inactive
auction days which immediately follow an activeauction day because, if a bidder is nancially
constrained, it may be that exhausting the available funds in day t makes her not bid in day t+1:
This yields a total number of 131,089 bidder-auction day observations. Because of the large number
of zeros for the dependent variable ((i) or (ii)), we conducted a tobit regression with clustered (by
25This strikes us as sensible, because auctions are typically conducted on a monthly basis; that is, roughly a month
goes by between auction weeks.
26The bidder-specic variables are (i) the total number of bids placed, (ii) the total number of auctions in which
she has participated, (iii) the total nancial expenditure incurred (which includes bid costs as well as the nal auction
price if she has won an auction) and (iv) the number of previous auction wins. We have also created lagged variables
for (ii) and (iii). The auction day-specic variables are: the total number of auctions, the average retail price of all
items to be auctioned during the day, the number of auctions for each item brand and for each item type.
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number of daily auctions for each brand
number of daily auctions for each type of good
number of previous auction w ins 15.54 (2.17) *** 1.11 (0.07) *** 9.49 (0.92) *** -0.19 (0.07) ***
total expenditure in previous day 0.46 (0.03) *** 0.01 (0.002) *** -0.27 (0.01) *** 0.00 (0.001)
number of auctions w here bidder w as active in previous day -3.82 (0.22) *** -0.33 (0.01) *** 0.80 (0.07) *** -0.09 (0.005) ***
average retail price of daily auctions -0.07 (0.003) *** -0.01 (0.0002) *** 0.00 (0.003) 0.00 (0.0002) ***
number of daily auctions -1.92 (0.18) *** -0.25 (0.01) *** 2.05 (0.82) ** 0.33 (0.06) ***
constant 28.61 (1.45) *** 4.95 (0.12) *** 9.78 (1.66) *** 2.81 (0.12) ***
N
Pseudo-R2
F-test
(***) Signif icant at the 1% level; (**) Signif icant at the 5% level; (*) Signif icant at the 10% level
yes
yes
yes
yes
80,349
0.005
46.9
80,349
0.005
145.9
Dep. variable: (i)=total number of bids placed by each bidder
during an auction day; (ii)=total number of auctions in w hich
bidder is active during an auction day
131,089
0.012
35.5
131,089
0.030
554.9
yes
yes
yes
yes
tobit (i) tobit (ii) FE (i) FE (ii)
Coef. (Std. error) Coef. (Std. error) Coef. (Std. error) Coef. (Std. error)
Table 4: Indirect test for the existence of budget constraints
bidder) standard errors. The results are presented as tobit (i)and tobit (ii) in Table 4. In a
second specication, we have only resorted to the active bidder-auction day data and performed a
xed-e¤ects (FE) regression. This is presented as FE (i)and FE (ii)in Table 4.
When the dependent variable is the total number of auctions in which the bidder participates,
the nancial expenditure in the previous day yields a positive and signicant (albeit small) or
insignicant e¤ect, in the tobit (ii) and FE (ii) models respectively. That is, bidders do not appear
to have daily nancial constraints in what concerns their choice of how many auctions to participate
in. When the dependent variable is the total number of bids placed, the previous days nancial
expenditure appears with a positive or negative (signicant) coe¢ cient in the tobit (i) and FE (i)
models respectively.27 The latter is the only model for which the existence of a daily nancial
constraint could not be rejected, although the marginal impact is rather small.28
Observation 6: Bidder behavior does not seem to be a¤ected by nancial constraints.
27 In a way, the FE specication (indirectly) tests the possible existence of nancial constraints conditional on a
bidder being active, whilst the tobit specication is more general and takes into account the possibility that nancial
constraints may lead to bidder inactivity (zero values for the dependent variables). If the latter is the true underlying
model, then FE would yield biased estimates (as it considers only the uncensored observations) and this can explain the
di¤erent signs across models for the total expenditure in the previous dayvariable (as well as for other explanatory
variables).
28The average total expenditure in the previous day is e2.25, which means that the respective marginal e¤ect
(evaluated at the mean) is  0:27 2:25 =  0:61 (the mean number of submitted bids is 11:71). Therefore, evaluated
at the mean, a e1 increase in the previous days total expenditure (a large increase in relative terms) reduces the
number of submitted bids by 0:61:
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4.4.2 Possible di¤erences in bidder strategies
Another possible concern with our results is whether the e¤ect of participating in multiple simulta-
neous auctions is truly a learning e¤ect.29 Indeed, di¤erent types of bidders may be using di¤erent
strategies. In order to analyze this possibility, we have classied bidders in one of three possible
categories: simultaneous bidders are bidders who have participated in more than one simulta-
neous auction throughout the period we analyze; seasoned biddersare bidders who have never
participated in more than an auction at a time, but who have either submitted multiple bids in
a single auction or a single bid in multiple (non-simultaneous) auctions; and single bid bidders
are bidders who have only submitted one bid in one single auction. Table 5 summarizes some
interesting descriptive statistics (averages for each bidder category).
First, most bidders are simultaneous bidders (68%) and account for a very large proportion of
all submitted bids (92%). Single bid bidders are relatively few (12%) and seasoned bidders (21%)
account for a very small proportion of all submitted bids (7.5%). Second, simultaneous bidders
participate in more auctions than seasoned bidders (6.3 vs. 1.4) but submit relatively fewer bids
(5.1 vs. 6.9). Therefore, overall, simultaneous bidders submit a larger number of bids across all
auctions than seasoned bidders (34 vs. 9) mainly because they participate in more auctions. Third,
simultaneous bidders are much more experienced at the time when they submit their rst auction
bid and win slightly more often, despite participating in auctions for items with relatively lower
retail prices. Fourth, simultaneous bidders submit their rst bid at a time when fewer unique
bidders have already submitted bids and submit relatively fewer rst hour bids.
Leaving aside the case of single bid bidders, this allows us to conjecture that although there
are some di¤erences between simultaneous and seasoned bidders, the main di¤erence appears to be
related to the number of auctions in which they participate and their experience when they make the
29We would like to thank a referee for suggesting this line of analysis.
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Variable
Simultaneous bidders
(% of total)
Seasoned bidders (%
of total)
Single bid bidders (% of
total)
Total
total number of bidders 25,652 (68%) 7,864 (21%) 4,484 (12%) 38,000
total number of submitted bids 865,970 (92.0%) 70,514 (7.5%) 4,484 (0.5%) 940,968
average number of submitted bids in all auctions 33.8 9.0 1.0 24.8
average number of auctions in which they participate 6.3 1.4 1.0 4.7
average number of bids per auction 5.1 6.9 1.0 5.0
average daily expenditure (€) 7.5 3.4 0.5 5.8
average experience (number of submitted bids) when submitting first bid 11.54 0.97 0.0 7.99
average percentage of wins in  auctions in which they participate 0.12% 0.09% 0.04% 0.10%
average retail price in auctions in which they participate 456.7 501.4 489.1 469.8
average number of unique bidders until they decide to enter 345.9 394.5 378.1 359.8
average percentage of first hour bids 5.7% 7.4% 10.3% 6.6%
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of bidder categories
decision to enter. That is, their being active in simultaneous auctions emerges as the most striking
di¤erence between bidder types. This suggests that our results may indeed be picking up a learning
e¤ect. In order to conrm this conjecture, we ran the pseudo hazard rates regression presented in
Section 4.2.2 for simultaneous bidders only. The results are presented in Table 10 (Appendix A)
and indicate that, for simultaneous bidders, the sunk cost fallacy is present, but learning e¤ects 
both through experience as well as through participation in simultaneous auctions  are rather
helpful in mitigating its e¤ects, thus broadly conrming the results presented in Section 4.2.2.
5 Discussion and conclusion
This paper contributes to the emerging empirical evidence on penny auctions, an auction format
which typically raises signicantly higher revenue than the underlying market value of the auctioned
item. Our particular interest is the e¤ect of learning over time and across auctions as bidders become
more experienced. In the dataset we have used, possibly because it is related to a relatively more
homogeneous set of products than that used by earlier literature, prot margins are very high: on
average, 219%. We nd that, using auction-level data, the standard supply and demand variables
have the expected e¤ects on nal auction prices: increased supply (through a higher number of
penny auctions occurring simultaneously) reduces nal auction prices, whilst increased demand
(through a higher number of unique bidders) increases them. In addition, rst hour bidding activity
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contributes positively towards higher auction prices, to the benet of the auctioneer.
Using bid-level data, we nd that more experienced bidders learn to participate less often in
penny auctions and, as one would expect, the participation decision is negatively inuenced by
perceived competition. We also nd evidence of the sunk cost fallacy, identied by Augenblick
(2016): bidders are more reluctant to drop out the higher is the number of bids they have already
submitted. Experience acquired through bids submitted in one or more auctions over time does
alleviate the sunk cost fallacy, but participation in multiple simultaneous auctions emerges as a
signicantly more e¤ective learning mechanism. Therefore, we nd evidence of behavioral spillovers,
some of which appear to be learning e¤ects. Looking at individual auction surplus conrms these
results: experience exhibits a negative relationship with surplus, but participation in simultaneous
auctions is associated with higher surpluses. Signaling and reputation-building strategies do appear
to be used, but, with the exception of rst hour bids, with little success in terms of outcomes.
Although our penny auction data has some limitations - for instance, it does not allow us to use
bidder sophistication indicators such as those used by Wang and Xu (2012) - and is certainly smaller
than that used by previous authors, it is su¢ ciently homogeneous to present a coherent picture of
bidding behavior in penny auctions. Our most striking nding is that horizontal learning(within
a time window but through bid submission or participation in more than one simultaneous auction)
is a much more e¤ective learning mechanism than vertical learning(through bid submission or
auction participation over time). This, to the best of our knowledge, is a novel result in the penny
auction literature and bears some relationship with the behavioral spillovers literature (Bednar et
al., 2012; Cason et al., 2012; Falk et al., 2013). More generally, this result raises relevant questions
on behavioral spillovers/learning e¤ects that may occur in other sequential games (e.g., bargaining
games). In particular, it raises the possibility that, in some games, players may arrive more quickly
at equilibrium strategies when playing two identical or similar games simultaneously rather than
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sequentially, although preliminary evidence by Falk et al. (2013) does not appear to corroborate this
claim. In addition, this paper is eminently empirical and our nding of evidence of both vertical
and horizontallearning e¤ects clearly suggests that a theoretical extension to Augenblicks (2016)
model which incorporates these two features is warranted. Such a model would yield equilibrium
predictions for the role played by each type of learning e¤ect, which could then be reconciled with
our empirical results. These are likely to be the next steps in our research.
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A Appendix - Auxiliary Tables and Figures
Variable
Number of
observations
Mean
Standard
deviation
Minimum Maximum
final auction price 403 24.01 25.25 0.10 167.89
retail price 403 369.97 198.07 9.90 999.90
profit (euros) 403 854.77 1191.21 -788.76 7962.49
profit (percentage of retail price) 403 219.30 249.84 -95.92 1327.30
average number of simultaneous auctions 403 6.88 1.67 1.80 12.97
number of unique bidders 403 438.98 333.37 8.00 2019.00
HHI of unique bidders' bids 403 230.72 307.04 28.31 2861.23
Profit percentage of auctions over time
auction week 1 61 192.51 270.44
auction week 2 46 385.50 302.84
auction week 3 44 296.61 264.00
auction week 4 48 183.11 202.49
auction week 5 48 185.60 205.33
auction week 6 47 203.66 195.49
auction week 7 109 170.47 234.69
TOTAL 403 219.30 249.84
Profit percentage by type of good
PC 24 292.92 241.76
pen 2 -3.63 44.63
services 22 84.21 235.47
tablet PC 12 350.11 244.51
mobile phone 343 219.54 248.32
TOTAL 403 219.30 249.84
Profit percentage of mobile phones by brand
Apple 55 307.81 313.71
BlackBerry 38 185.21 174.00
Google 4 352.32 267.62
HTC 49 110.89 182.18
Huawei 3 346.12 139.76
LG 39 99.04 140.06
Nokia 43 278.79 268.49
Optimus 44 277.99 242.01
Samsung 40 240.12 264.60
Sony 28 205.90 252.79
TOTAL 343 219.54 248.32
Auction level data
Table 6: Description and summary statistics of main variables in auction level database
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Figure 2: Empirical hazard rate (left) and graphical check of adequacy of Weibull distribution
(right) for nal auction prices
25
Variable
Number of
observations
Mean
Standard
deviation
Minimum Maximum
total number of bids 940,968
expected total number of bids (*) 967,781
coverage 97.2%
average number of bids per auction 403 2,334.9 2,405.8 10 16,709
expected total number of bids per auction (*) 403 2,401.4 2,525.2 10 16,789
average coverage 403 98.1% 4.3% 65.1% 100.6%
total number of unique bidders 38,000
average number of individual bids per auction 176,908 5.32 14.12 1 1518
(*)  us ing data  from auction database
Bid level data
Table 7: Description and summary statistics of main variables in bid level database
distributions AIC score
Exponential 948.6
Weibull 596.7
Gompertz 590.2
Lognormal 640.8
Loglogistic 605.6
Generalized Gamma 598.7
Table 8: AIC scores for nal auction prices and underlying distributions
dummies for auction w eek
dummies for type of good
dummies for brand of good
average number of simultaneous auctions 1.269 (0.057) *** 1.211 (0.052) *** 1.268 (0.055) ***
number of (normalised) f irst hour bids 0.121 (0.038) *** 0.165 (0.049) *** 0.193 (0.054) ***
number of unique bidders 0.994 (0.0004) *** 0.995 (0.0003) *** 0.995 (0.0004) ***
HHI of unique bidders' bids 1.001 (0.0002) *** 1.001 (0.0002) *** 1.001 (0.0002) ***
constant 0.070 (0.038) *** 0.011 (0.006) ***
N
Log-likelihood
LR (chi-square)
(***) Signif icant at the 1% level; (**) Signif icant at the 5% level; (*) Signif icant at the 10% level
-1,710
616
403
yes
yes
yes
yes
403
-268
553
Cox (PH) Gompertz (PH) Weibull (PH)
Coef. (Std. error) Coef. (Std. error) Coef. (Std. error)
403
-271
541
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
Table 9: Hazard rate estimation
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dependent variable: leave
dummies for auction w eek
dummies for type of good
dummies for brand of good
average number of simultaneous auctions 0.02959 (0.00056) *** 0.02981 (0.00056) ***
first hour bid (dummy) 0.00434 (0.00391) 0.00179 (0.00691)
first hour bid (dummy) x ln(number of previously submitted bids) -0.00369 (0.00274)
first hour bid (dummy) x ln(number of simultaneous auctions in w hich bidder is participating) 0.01063 (0.00609) *
number of unique bidders until bid submitted 0.00012 (0.00001) *** 0.00013 (0.00001) ***
HHI of unique bidders' bids until bid is submitted -0.000001 (0) -0.000002 (0)
ln(number of bids submitted in auction) -0.11932 (0.00073) *** -0.18247 (0.002) ***
ln(number of previously submitted bids) 0.06402 (0.00102) *** 0.05624 (0.00106) ***
ln(number of simultaneous auctions in w hich bidder is participating) 0.06467 (0.00135) *** 0.05868 (0.00181) ***
ln(number of previously submitted bids) x ln(number of bids submitted in auction) 0.01455 (0.00045) ***
ln(number of simultaneous auctions in w hich bidder is participating) x ln(number of bids submitted in auction) 0.00664 (0.00092) ***
number of previous auction w ins 0.01225 (0.00457) *** -0.00441 (0.00463)
bid amount 0.00004 (0.00012) -0.00007 (0.00012)
N
Log-likelihood
Wald (chi-square)
(***) Signif icant at the 1% level; (**) Signif icant at the 5% level; (*) Signif icant at the 10% level
RE probit RE probit
Coef. (Std. error) Coef. (Std. error)
865,970
-351,912
41,042
865,970
-351,287
42,219
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
Table 10: Pseudo hazard rate estimation for simultaneous biddersonly
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